Phenomenology has at least three main meanings in philosophical history: one in the writings of G.W.F. Hegel, another in the writings of Edmund Husserl in 1920, and a third, deriving from Husserl's work, in the writings of his former research assistant Martin Heidegger in 1927:
- For G.W.F. Hegel, phenomenology is an approach to philosophy that begins with an exploration of phenomena
(what presents itself to us in conscious experience) as a means to
finally grasp the absolute, logical, ontological and metaphysical Spirit
that is behind phenomena. This has been called a "dialectical phenomenology".
- For Edmund Husserl, phenomenology is "the reflective study of the essence of consciousness as experienced from the first-person point of view."[1] Phenomenology takes the intuitive experience of phenomena
(what presents itself to us in phenomenological reflexion) as its
starting point and tries to extract from it the essential features of
experiences and the essence of what we experience. When generalized to the essential features of any possible experience, this has been called "transcendental phenomenology". Husserl's view was based on aspects of the work of Franz Brentano and was developed further by philosophers such as Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Max Scheler, Edith Stein, Dietrich von Hildebrand and Emmanuel Levinas.
- Martin Heidegger
believed that Husserl's approach overlooked basic structural features
of both the subject and object of experience (what he called their
"being"), and expanded phenomenological enquiry to encompass our
understanding and experience of Being itself, thus making phenomenology
the method (in the first phase of his career at least) of the study of
being: ontology.
The difference in approach between Husserl and Heidegger influenced the development of existential phenomenology and existentialism in France, as is seen in the work of Jean-Paul Sartre and Simone de Beauvoir. Munich phenomenologists (Johannes Daubert, Adolf Reinach, Alexander Pfänder in Germany and Alfred Schütz in Austria), and Paul Ricoeur have all been influenced. Readings of Husserl and Heidegger have also been crucial elements of the philosophies of Jacques Derrida and Bernard Stiegler.
Historical overview of the use of the term
Although the term "phenomenology" was used occasionally in the history of philosophy before Husserl,
modern use ties it more explicitly to his particular method. Following
is a list of thinkers in rough chronological order who used the term
"phenomenology" in a variety of ways, with brief comments on their
contributions:[2]
- Friedrich Christoph Oetinger (1702 - 1782) German pietist, for the study of the "divine system of relations"[3]
- David Hume (1711 – 1776) Scottish philosopher, called variably a skeptic or a common sense advocate. While this connection is somewhat tendentious, Hume, in A Treatise of Human Nature,
does seem to take a phenomenological or psychological approach by
describing the process of reasoning causality in psychological terms.
This is also the inspiration for the Kantian distinction between phenomenal and noumenal reality.[4]
- Johann Heinrich Lambert (1728–1777) (mathematician, physicist and philosopher) for the theory of appearances underlying empirical knowledge.[5]
- Immanuel Kant (1724–1804), in the Critique of Pure Reason, distinguished between objects as phenomena, which are objects as shaped and grasped by human sensibility and understanding, and objects as things-in-themselves or noumena, which do not appear to us in space and time and about which we can make no legitimate judgements.
- G.W.F. Hegel
(1770–1831) challenged Kant's doctrine of the unknowable
thing-in-itself, and declared that by knowing phenomena more fully we
can gradually arrive at a consciousness of the absolute and spiritual
truth of Divinity. Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit, published in 1807, prompted many opposing views including the existential work of Søren Kierkegaard, Martin Heidegger and Jean-Paul Sartre, as well as the materialist work of Marx and his many followers.
- Carl Stumpf (1848-1936), student of Brentano and mentor to Husserl, used it to refer to an ontology of sensory contents.
- Edmund Husserl (1859–1938) established phenomenology at first as a kind of "descriptive psychology" and later as a transcendental and eidetic science of consciousness. He is considered as the founder of contemporary phenomenology.
- Martin Heidegger (1889–1976) criticized Husserl's theory of phenomenology and attempted to develop a theory of ontology that led him to his original theory of Dasein, the non-dualistic human being.
Later usage is mostly based on or (critically) related to Husserl's
introduction and use of the term. This branch of philosophy differs from
others in that it tends to be more "descriptive" than "prescriptive".
Husserl and the origin of his phenomenology
Husserl derived many important concepts that are central to
phenomenology from the works and lectures of his teachers, the
philosophers and psychologists Franz Brentano and Carl Stumpf.[6]
An important element of phenomenology that Husserl borrowed from Brentano was intentionality, the notion that the main characteristic of consciousness is that it is always intentional.
Intentionality, which could be summarised as the "directedness" or
"aboutness" of mental acts, describes the basic structure of
consciousness. Every mental act is directed at or contains an object —
the so-called intentional object. Every belief, desire, etc. has
an object to which it refers, i.e. the believed, the desired. The
property of being intentional, of having an intentional object, is the
key feature which distinguishes mental/psychological phenomena from
physical phenomena (objects), because physical phenomena lack
intentionality altogether. Intentionality is the key concept by means of
which phenomenology attempts to overcome the subject/object dichotomy
prevalent in modern philosophy.
Precursors and influences
Husserl's Logische Untersuchungen (1900/1901)
In the first edition of the Logical Investigations, still
under the influence of Brentano, Husserl describes his position as
"descriptive psychology". Husserl analyzes the intentional structures of
mental acts and how they are directed at both real and ideal objects.
The first volume of the Logical Investigations, the Prolegomena to Pure Logic, begins with a devastating critique of psychologism, i.e., the attempt to subsume the a priori
validity of the laws of logic under psychology. Husserl establishes a
separate field for research in logic, philosophy and phenomenology,
independently from the empirical sciences.[7]
Transcendental phenomenology after the Ideen (1913)
Some years after the publication of the Logical Investigations, Husserl made some key elaborations which led him to the distinction between the act of consciousness (noesis) and the phenomena at which it is directed (the noemata).
- "noetic" refers to the intentional act of consciousness (believing, willing, etc.)
- "noematic" refers to the object or content (noema) which appears in
the noetic acts (respectively the believed, wanted, hated and loved
...).
What we observe is not the object as it is in itself, but how and inasmuch it is given in the intentional acts. Knowledge of essences
would only be possible by "bracketing" all assumptions about the
existence of an external world and the inessential (subjective) aspects
of how the object is concretely given to us. This procedure Husserl
called epoché.
Husserl in a later period concentrated more on the ideal, essential
structures of consciousness. As he wanted to exclude any hypothesis on
the existence of external objects, he introduced the method of
phenomenological reduction to eliminate them. What was left over was the
pure transcendental ego, as opposed to the concrete empirical ego. Now
(transcendental) phenomenology is the study of the essential structures
that are left in pure consciousness: this amounts in practice to the
study of the noemata and the relations among them. The philosopher Theodor Adorno criticised Husserl's concept of phenomenological epistemology in his metacritique "Against Epistemology", which is anti-foundationalist in its stance.
Transcendental phenomenologists include: Oskar Becker, Aron Gurwitsch and Alfred Schutz.
Realist phenomenology
After Husserl's publication of the Ideen in 1913, many phenomenologists took a critical stance towards his new theories. Especially the members of the Munich group distanced themselves from his new transcendental phenomenology and preferred the earlier realist phenomenology of the first edition of the Logical Investigations.
Realist phenomenologists include: Adolf Reinach, Alexander Pfänder, Johannnes Daubert, Max Scheler, Roman Ingarden, Nicolai Hartmann, and Hans Köchler.
Existential phenomenology
Existential phenomenology differs from transcendental phenomenology by its rejection of the transcendental ego.
Merleau-Ponty objects to the ego's transcendence of the world, which
for Husserl leaves the world spread out and completely transparent
before the conscious. Heidegger thinks of conscious being as always
already in the world. Transcendence is maintained in existential
phenomenology to the extent that the method of phenomenology must take a
presuppositionless starting point - transcending claims about the world
arising from, for example, natural or scientific attitudes or theories
of the ontological nature of the world.
While Husserl thought philosophy to be a scientific discipline that had to be founded on a phenomenology understood as epistemology, Heidegger held a radically different view. Heidegger himself phrases their differences this way:
- For Husserl, the phenomenological reduction is the method of
leading phenomenological vision from the natural attitude of the human
being whose life is involved in the world of things and persons back to
the transcendental
life of consciousness and its noetic-noematic experiences, in which
objects are constituted as correlates of consciousness. For us,
phenomenological reduction means leading phenomenological vision back
from the apprehension of a being, whatever may be the character of that
apprehension, to the understanding of the Being of this being
(projecting upon the way it is unconcealed).[8]
According to Heidegger, philosophy was not at all a scientific
discipline, but more fundamental than science itself. According to him
science is only one way of knowing the world with no specialized access
to truth. Furthermore, the scientific mindset itself is built on a much
more "primordial" foundation of practical, everyday knowledge. Husserl
was skeptical of this approach, which he regarded as quasi-mystical, and
it contributed to the divergence in their thinking.
Instead of taking phenomenology as prima philosophia or a foundational discipline, Heidegger took it as a metaphysical ontology: "being is the proper and sole theme of philosophy... this means that philosophy is not a science of beings but of being.".[8] Yet to confuse phenomenology and ontology is an obvious error.
Phenomena are not the foundation or Ground of Being. Neither are they
appearances, for as Heidegger argues in Being and Time, an appearance is "that which shows itself in something else," while a phenomenon is "that which shows itself in itself."
While for Husserl, in the epochè, being appeared only as a correlate
of consciousness, for Heidegger being is the starting point. While for
Husserl we would have to abstract from all concrete determinations of
our empirical ego, to be able to turn to the field of pure
consciousness, Heidegger claims that: "the possibilities and
destinies of philosophy are bound up with man's existence, and thus with
temporality and with historicality".[8]
However, ontological being and existential being are different
categories, so Heidegger's conflation of these categories is, according
to Husserl's view, the root of Heidegger's error. Husserl charged
Heidegger with raising the question of ontology but failing to answer
it, instead switching the topic to the Dasein, the only being for whom
Being is an issue. That is neither ontology nor phenomenology, according
to Husserl, but merely abstract anthropology. To clarify, perhaps, by
abstract anthropology, as a non-existentialist searching for essences,
Husserl rejected the existentialism implicit in Heidegger's distinction
between being (sein) as things in reality from Being (Da-sein) as the
encounter with being, as when being becomes present to us, i.e. is
unconcealed. [9]
Existential phenomenologists include: Martin Heidegger (1889 – 1976), Hannah Arendt (1906 – 1975), Emmanuel Levinas (1906 – 1995), Gabriel Marcel (1889 – 1973), Jean-Paul Sartre (1905 – 1980), Paul Ricoeur (1913 - 2005) and Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1908 – 1961).
Criticisms of phenomenology
Daniel Dennett has criticized phenomenology on the basis that its explicitly first-person approach is incompatible with the scientific
third-person approach, going so far as to coin the term
"autophenomenology" to emphasize this aspect and to contrast it with his
own alternative, which he calls heterophenomenology.
Dennett's criticism reflects a more general attitude among analytic
philosophers of mind. Phenomenologists, however, are often quick to
point out that the relationship between phenomenological and natural
scientific methods has been a major theme in phenomenology since at
least Husserl [see The Crisis of the European Sciences], though Dennett
makes no real attempt to engage with the work of phenomenologists on
this issue. Many proponents of phenomenology argue that natural science
can make sense only as a human activity, i.e., an activity which
presupposes the fundamental structures of the 'first-person
perspective.' While not hostile to the natural sciences per se, many
thinkers in the Heideggerian tradition would regard criticisms such as
Dennett's metaphysical rather than purely scientific claims, and thus
susceptible to the usual criticisms directed at metaphysical theories of
all kinds. Powerful defenses of the phenomenological approach against
science-inspired reductive naturalism have been made by Hubert Dreyfus and Charles Taylor among others.
As part of an ongoing debate with Hubert Dreyfus, John Searle
has argued that much of the work done by phenomenologists on the
philosophy of mind suffers from what he terms the 'Phenomenological
Illusion'[1].
Searle defines the Phenomenological Illusion as the mistake of assuming
that what is not phenomenologically present is not real, and that what
is phenomenologically present is an adequate description how things
really are. According to Searle, this leads some phenomenologists to
make mistaken claims about subjects such as meaning, social reality,
functions, and causal self referentiality. Searle himself makes explicit
that, defined as the examination of consciousness, he has no problem
with phenomenology itself.
List of phenomenologists and phenomenology-derived theorists
See also
Phenomenology in popular culture
The film Dark Star
(1974) includes a scene where an astronaut tries to teach a
malfunctioning sentient bomb phenomenology in order to prevent it from
detonating.[10]
Shepard Fairey's Andre the Giant Has a Posse sticker campaign has been self-described as an "experiment in phenomenology."[11]
Further reading
- The IAP LIBRARY offers very fine sources for Phenomenology.
- The London Philosophy Study Guide offers many suggestions on what to read, depending on the student's familiarity with the subject: Phenomenology
- Dermot Moran, Introduction to Phenomenology (Oxford:
Routledge, 2000) - Charting phenomenology from Brentano, through Husserl
and Heidegger, to Gadamer, Arendt, Levinas, Sartre, Merleau-Ponty and
Derrida.
- Robert Sokolowski, "Introduction to Phenomenology (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press 2000) - An excellent non-historical
introduction to phenomenology.
- Herbert Spiegelberg,
"The Phenomenological Movement: A Historical Introduction," 3rd ed.
(The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1983). The most comprehensive source on
the development of the phenomenological movement.
- David Stewart and Algis Mickunas, "Exploring Phenomenology: A Guide
to the Field and its Literature" (Athens: Ohio University Press 1990)
- Michael Hammond, Jane Howarth, and Russell Kent, "Understanding Phenomenology" (Oxford: Blackwell 1995)
- Christopher Macann, Four Phenomenological Philosophers: Husserl, Heidegger, Sartre, Merleau-Ponty (New York: Routledge: 1993)
- Jan Patočka, "Qu'est-ce que la phénoménologie?" In: Qu'est-ce que la phénoménologie?,
ed. and trans. E. Abrams (Grenoble: J. Millon 1988), pp. 263–302. An
answer to the question, What is phenomenology?, from a student of both
Husserl and Heidegger and one of the most important phenomenologists of
the latter half of the twentieth century.
- William A. Luijpen and Henry J. Koren, "A First Introduction to
Existential Phenomenology" (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press 1969)
- Richard M. Zaner, "The Way of Phenomenology" (Indianapolis: Pegasus 1970)
- Hans Köchler, Die Subjekt-Objekt-Dialektik in der transzendentalen Phänomenologie. Das Seinsproblem zwischen Idealismus und Realismus. (Meisenheim a.G.: Anton Hain, 1974) (German)
- Hans Köchler, Phenomenological Realism: Selected Essays (Frankfurt a. M./Bern: Peter Lang, 1986)
- Mark Jarzombek, The Psychologizing of Modernity (Cambridge University Press, 2000).
- Pierre Thévenaz, "What is Phenomenology?" (Chicago: Quadrangle Books 1962)
- ed. James M. Edie, "An Invitation to Phenomenology" (Chicago: Quadrangle Books 1965) - A collection of seminal phenomenological essays.
- ed. R. O. Elveton, "The Phenomenology of Husserl: Selected Critical
Readings" (Seattle: Noesis Press 2000) - Key essays about Husserl's
phenomenology.
- ed. Laura Doyle, Bodies of Resistance: New Phenomenologies of Politics, Agency, and Culture. Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 2001.
- eds. Richard Zaner and Don Ihde, "Phenomenology and Existentialism"
(New York: Putnam 1973) - Contains many key essays in existential
phenomenology.
- Albert Borgmann and his work in philosophy of technology.
- eds. Natalie Depraz, Francisco Varela, Pierre Vermersch, On Becoming Aware: A Pragmatics of Experiencing
(Amsterdam: John Benjamins 2003) - searches for the sources and the
means for a disciplined practical approach to exploring human
experience.
- Don Idhe, "Experimental Phenomenology: An Introduction" (Albany, NY: SUNY Press)
- Sara Ahmed, "Queer Phenomenology: Orientations, Objects Others" (Durham: Duke University Press 2006)
- Michael Jackson, Existential Anthropology
- Sartre, Jean-Paul. Being and Nothingness.
- Shaun Gallagher and Dan Zahavi,The Phenomenological Mind. London: Routledge, 2007.
External links
Journals
References
- ^ Smith, David Woodruff (2007), Husserl, London-New York: Routledge
- ^ Partially based on Schuhmann,
Karl (2004), ""Phänomenologie": Eine Begriffsgeschichtilche Reflexion",
in Leijenhorst, Cees & Steenbakkers, Piet, Karl Schuhmann. Selected Papers on Phenomenology, Dordrecht / Boston / London: Kluwer, pp. 1-33
- ^ Ernst Benz, Christian Kabbalah: Neglected Child of Theology
- ^ Ernest Campbell Mossner. The Life of David Hume. Oxford University Press, 1980.
- ^ Lambert, Johann
Heinrich (1772). Anmerkungen und Zusätze zur Entwerfung der Land- und
Himmelscharten. Von J. H. Lambert (1772.) Hrsg. von A. Wangerin. Mit 21
Textfiguren. (xml). W. Engelmann, reprint 1894.
- ^ Rollinger, Robin (1999), Husserl's Position in the School of Brentano, Dordrecht / Boston / London: Kluwer
- ^ On the Logical Investigations, see Zahavi, Dan & Stjernfelt, Frederik, eds. (2002), One Hundred Years of Phenomenology (Husserl's Logical Investigations Revisited), Dordrecht / Boston / London: Kluwer; and Mohanty, Jitendra Nath, ed. (1977), Readings on Edmund Husserl’s Logical Investigations, Den Haag: Nijhoff
- ^ a b c Heidegger, Martin (1975), "Introduction", The Basic Problems of Phenomenology, Indiana University Press
- ^ I have
attempted to respond to the request for clarification of Heidegger's
distinction between being and Being. My info source was http://www.uni.edu/boedeker/NNhHeidegger2.doc. It was not copied and pasted but rephrased for copyright reasons.
- ^ , <http://www2.english.uiuc.edu/cybercinema/bomb20.htm>. Retrieved on {{#iferror:2007 |23 November 2007 |22 November 2007}}
- ^ OBEY Manifesto, Shepard Fairey, 1990.
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