Sign Historical Group
THE USAF-SPONSORED COLORADO PROJECT
FOR THE
SCIENTIFIC STUDY OF UFOS
1995 MUFON Symposium Proceedings Presentation by
Michael D. Swords, Ph.D.
Professor Natural Sciences
Western Michigan
University
(Reproduced by SHG with permission of the author)
ABSTRACT
One of the most significant elements in the history of
UFOlogy was the so-called Condon Project, centered at the University of Colorado
in 1967-1968. This paper discusses the origin, methodological philosophy and
overview of the research problem, the activities, results, and external impacts
of this work. The paper finds a complex mix of personalities, attitudes, and
theories enmeshed in political and social forces, which predestined the
project's conclusions and crippled its ability to make any scientific
contribution toward the solution of the UFO mystery. Its resultant impacts were
nevertheless formidable, both negatively and positively.
THE ORIGINS OF THE COLORADO PROJECT
When telling a story one is told to begin at the beginning, but,
time and life being continuous rivers stretching back into the past, where does
one really begin? Although starting with the Big Bang and working forward to
1966 might be scientifically most defensible, perhaps beginning with one of my
favorite people, J. Allen Hynek, would be preferable. Dr. Hynek, in his famous
role as Project Bluebook scientific advisor, had been around the idea of
transferring responsibility for UFO research to academia (or some more dedicated
non-military research institutions for over a decade. General Thomas D. White,
USAF chief of staff, had suggested as early as 1955 that Air Force Intelligence
turn over the UFO problem to an outside contractor, such as Battelle or Rand
(Watson, 1955). Hynek, and the military personnel at Bluebook, had in the
interim toyed with the idea of enlisting NASA, the National Science Foundation,
and the Brookings Institution for aid. In the summer of 1965, the Pentagon asked
Hynek for his views on involving the National Academy of Sciences. Hynek replied
in August of 1965 (Hynek, 1965). Hynek's letter to Colonel John Spaulding agreed
that NAS involvement would strengthen the potential for solving both the
scientific and the sociological problems, which the Air Force currently faced.
And, the structure, a working panel of committed experts, should include both
physical and social scientists, and involve itself over a several month period.
Hynek's views, of course, were not acted upon with any immediacy,
but they added to the Pentagon's rolling pot of opinions about how to get rid of
the UFO problem. The next major step toward the Colorado Project grew out of
this stew when a select committee of the Air Force's Scientific Advisory Board
met to consider the issue in February of 1966. This was the "O'Brien Committee".
The group met for one day, "considered" the information (if such a
characterization can be allowed for such a brief affair), and recommended a
strengthening of the UFO investigative program. The major strengthening was to
be accomplished by contracting a central university (with several allied
universities to supply investigative teams) to coordinate in-depth research on
about one hundred sightings per year and to be in immediate touch and
cooperation with Project Bluebook. The project should be as public in its
research as possible, and present its results regularly to interested
congressmen (Steiner, 1966). This committee report was released in February of
1966.
Coincident with the release there arrived (mainly in Michigan)
one of the biggest UFO flaps in history. The flap energized the UFO community
(especially NICAP and James McDonald), but more importantly for our story, it
pushed the decision on a university study over the threshold. And Allen Hynek
played a primary, and unwanted, role. Hynek's characterization of the
Dexter-Hillsdale sightings as "swamp gas" unleashed a howl of anger, protest,
ridicule, and raw publicity across the whole globe. Congressmen became so
put-off by the apparent USAF irresponsibility that they put heat on the Pentagon
to explain how this could be going on. Gerald Ford essentially demanded an
apology to his constituents. The level of grief doled out to Allen Hynek finally
and inexorably pushed him over his threshold of loyal hyperconservatism as well.
Hynek, in a different style, initiated his own "coming out party" at the same
time as the more aggressive, flamboyant McDonald. Within the House Armed
Services Committee, he, Air Force Secretary Harold Brown, and Bluebook chief
Hector Quintanilla were called to testify within a week of the swamp gas furor.
Hynek strongly supported the O'Brien Committee recommendations for a university
study, and the committee report was attached to the congressional
hearings.
In May the Air Force announced that it would begin looking for
the recommended universities. Jim McDonald began lobbying for his own
participation, and, in his usual over-enthusiasm, succeeded instead in
convincing persons like Brian O'Brien
not to consider him (or
his university presumably). Allen Hynek wrote Secretary Brown supporting his
decision to place this in the hands of civilian scientists and out of the
military. Little progress was made in getting a topflight scientist to take on
the task, however. Through the month of June the Air Force had no expressions of
interest. In July the A' Force changed "salesmen" and tried again. At the very
end of the month, Colonel Thomas Ratchford of the Office of Scientific Research
appealed to Dr. Edward Condon, and a quality that he had displayed continually
throughout his distinguished career, patriotic loyalty, and gained his
agreement, if the university administration, faculty, and allied institutions
would give their support.
EDWARD UHLER CONDON
Dr. Condon was a very prominent scientist, and very much the
governmental and security insider. He played a major role in the development of
nuclear weapons in WWII, and became the director of the National Bureau of
Standards, where he resided at the start of the UFO phenomenon in 1947. In that
capacity he was also a member of the executive committee of the
National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics (NACA), which became NASA. He was
president of the American Physical Society, the American Association for the
Advancement of Science, and the American Physics Teachers Association. He was
elected to the prestigious National Academy of Sciences, and was a member of
Washington's elite Cosmos Club. Despite a bout of insane persecution by the
McCarthyist House Committee on Un-American Activities, he never lost the
confidence of anyone that mattered either in science or in the military. After
retiring from the NBS, he bounced around briefly, landing in Colorado at a joint
facility funded by the University and the NBS. There, he had settled in as a
patriarch of physical science whose activities were more organizational and
service-oriented than basic research. His reputation was made. His personal and
organizational relations were strong. He had little to risk even in a
potentially risky business. Here, he had encountered an administrator who
admired him as an American scientific legend: Robert Low.
THE PROJECT'S PERSONNEL AND STRUCTURE
It is a tribute to the chaos and tribulations of the Project that
one cannot set down a straightforward and meaningful listing of the working
staff. The original Air Force contract listed seven names: Condon, Colorado
Administrator Robert Low, psychologists William Scott, David Saunders, and
Michael Wertheimer, plus chairman of psychology Stuart Cook, and atmospheric
physicist Franklin Roach. Low would serve as "project coordinator", essentially
being Condon's arms, legs, and most of his brains on the running of all phases
of the affair. Edward Condon would, as much as possible, make heavy executive
decisions and otherwise "play" in the project only as much as he liked. Of these
seven named researchers two were virtual immediate drop-outs: Scott and Cook.
They cannot in any meaningful way be considered contributing personnel (Brittin
et al, 1966).
Many other persons figured in the mix. Some flashed on the scene
and were gone. Some were distant contractors working in isolation. Others were
intimately involved. Of the latter, there are seven names for whom anyone would
grant a significant on-the-ground project involvement with UFO cases and
investigation: chemist Roy Craig, electrical engineer Norman Levine,
astrophysicist William Hartmann, physicist Frederick Ayer, administrative
assistant and preliminary case screener Mary Lou Armstrong, and grad students
Dan Culberson and James Wadsworth. Many others were involved. Of these, the ones
who contributed significantly in either counseling the project and interacting
with it on-site, or in doing field investigations, were plasma physicist Martin
Altschuler, radar analyst Gordon Thayer, physicist Gerald Rothberg, and auto
engineer Frederick Hooven. These individuals are distinguished from a tribe of
others by having some more-than-fleeting direct involvement with project
investigations and personnel.
Because of the social conflicts and alleged incompetent
leadership of the project, the list of contributors was unstable, and the second
half of the project became a disorganized scramble to create a final document
from "what was left", but the following is my best estimate of a proper naming
of the research staff:
Primary team:
Edward Condon, physicist, Colorado
Robert Low, administrator, Colorado
Franklin Roach, physicist-astronomer, Environmental
Science Services Administration
David Saunders, psychologist, Colorado
Michael Wertheimer, psychologist, Colorado
Roy Craig, chemist, Colorado
Norman Levine, electrical engineer, Arizona
Mary Lou Armstrong, administrative assistant, Colorado
William Hartmann, astronomer, Arizona
Frederick Ayer, physicist, Colorado
Dan Culberson, psychologist, Colorado
James Wadsworth, psychologist, Colorado
Secondary contributors:
Martin Altschuler, Astrophysics, NCAR
Gordon Thayer, physicist, ESSA
Gerald Rothberg, physicist, Stevens Tech
Frederick Hooven, engineer, Ford Motor Company
All these individuals (and others) worked hard enough to earn
their "letters" on the team, but, in the judgment of this author, the hardest
workers (for good or ill) were Low, Craig and Wadsworth. Saunders and Hartmann
deserve honorable mention. It is interesting to note that a graduate student
(Wadsworth) played such a major role in the case investigations.
The organizational structure of the project was, frankly, a mess.
It took several months for them to even attempt to decide on an organizational
structure. Major debates occurred regarding what they were supposed to be doing.
Each primary academic had a different (and strong) opinion about how to do the
research. The rough concept of Colorado as a central coordinating research
focusser allied to investigating teams dispersed in other schools around the
country fell apart almost immediately. Colorado would have to do basically what
was done itself, and contract out specific bits of academic research studies
elsewhere (studies, by the way, with no necessary connection to the more
mysterious core of UFO reports). The Air Force was supposed to be completely
cooperative in notifying the project of new cases, providing on-site help if
there was an air base involved, and generally digging out older cases and other
inside information. They were only marginally cooperative on all but the
provision of old Project Bluebook data. There was also to be a hotline where Air
Force, pilot, press et al could reach the Project with new sightings. With the
short time span for organization, this too was only marginally effective.
Different members of the "team" (it is a bit absurd to call it that) took on
tasks to which they were drawn, or, which they essentially insisted on doing.
Many things were planned and very few completed. It is a miracle of last-minute
creativity that the final report achieved any semblance of organized research at
all. This is merely to state a fact, not to blame. It was ridiculous to think
that a two year project (including the writing time) could start from total
ground zero on a topic like UFOs and
even get going smoothly by the time the grant ran out. Still, it
could have proceeded with a lot better direction than it had.
METHODOLOGY
And here was the rub. The Colorado Project was an unusual
scientific research grant in that it was almost forced upon a scientist who knew
little about the research problem, rather than empowering a scientist who knew
all about what he wanted to do. Robert Low, of course, was in no better position
to figure out what to do. There were apparent scientific experts available who
could have helped them immensely, but there were problems. Allen Hynek, still
employed by the USAF, was tainted by that connection, and was, in fact, ordered
not to get too close to the Project. The only other two obvious
candidates, James McDonald and Donald Menzel, were in such intellectually and
emotionally polarized positions that the Air Force could not risk involving them
either. The civilian experts, NICAP and APRO, were even less acceptable in an
academic testing ground. So the naive eggheads had to blunder forward on their
own, albeit receiving lots of "advice" from all sides.
One member of the Colorado team, who in most ways contributed
little to the research, at the beginning of the thinking period produced a
concept which had a powerful effect on all the deliberations. Michael Wertheimer
was a psychologist and interested in perception. He used his interests, and
philosophical reasoning, to verbalize what became known as the "Wertheimer
Hypothesis". It has two components: one psychological, one epistemological.
The psychological problem: In analyzing a UFO
report one is usually interested in the initial stimulus, which precipitated the
report. This agent is called the "distal stimulus". This event sends wavelengths
(light, sound) through the environment, which is often able to distort those
signals. When they finally land on the eye or the eardrum, they are labeled the
"proximal stimulus". Are these two stimuli identical (or better, is one a
faithful messenger of the other)? The sense preceptors turn the proximal
stimulus into neural impulses with more or less accuracy depending on chronic or
temporary factors within the individual's central nervous system. Upon reaching
the cortex, these impulses must be accurately perceived (sort of gelled into a
proper relation to themselves) and then cognition (knowing) must take place
(they are placed into a proper relation to what's already known or believed). At
every stage there is some risk of distortion. Once the reporter reports to the
UFO researcher, that researcher must not automatically take the report as an
accurate representation of the distal stimulus, which initiated it.
Wertheimer's point here, beyond the obvious, was that there has
been little in the way of testing "everyday folk" under observation
circumstances anything like those involved with UFO reports. Therefore there is
no data baseline against which to judge how much distortion is likely to occur
in raw reports. UFO researchers like McDonald and Menzel obviously were
operating on
very different assumptions regarding this matter.
The epistemological problem: The UFO research
scientist receives a large pile of such reports with various degrees of puzzling
elements and unknown degrees of distortion. He goes into these
honestly and with great skill and energy. If he is intellectually
honest, there will never be the day when he can claim to have simply,
unambiguously solved all the reports. He will be faced with piles labeled
"IFOs", "insufficient evidence", and "UFOs". Let us assume that he has been paid
a lot of money to test the hypothesis: some UFO reports refer to
extraterrestrial spacecraft. The fact that there exists, still, a pile called
"UFOS" (actually for strict philosophy's sake, even the "insufficient" pile will
do) indicates that the scientist
cannot prove that no UFO
reports refer to ET craft. However, the converse is also true. Barring something
truly astounding in the evidence, the existence of the "UFO" pile cannot prove
that the pile or any of its members relates to extraterrestrials either. All it
says is that the reports remain a mystery. Wertheimer suggested the word
"framasands" to categorize these cases, simply to emphasize that we could not
say what they were.
Anyone is free to disregard such logic and decide to go with
their own intuitions and "common sense", of course, but philosophically, and
even in most ways, scientifically, the argument is pretty tight (especially
given the psychological, stimuli-distorting precautions of the Wertheimer
preface). The argument staggered Condon. He wondered whether there was any way
to fruitfully proceed on the problem. It angered the USAF representative,
Colonel Robert Hippler, who wanted to argue that you
could,
within reason, disprove the Extraterrestrial Hypothesis. It nettled David
Saunders, an ETH-sympath, for the opposite reason. This was presented as the
lead-off idea to a briefing of USAF officials (Ratchford, Hippler, Quintanilla,
and others) in January of 1967. A debate on methodology naturally ensued (UFO
Study Project, 1967).
This briefing laid down the polarized positions of the main
project members, and the key USAF people, pretty clearly. Michael Wertheimer
wanted to create UFO-simulation events and then sweep through the area studying
the perceptual, memory, and reporting accuracies of the population. Another
psychologist, Stuart Cook, supported that. Colonel Hippler said absolutely not.
That's all we need: Inventing fake UFOs to fool people; a public relations
catastrophe for the Air Force. Cook, Condon, and Low wanted to focus on the
observer and the conditions surrounding the observation (a Menzelian
debunking-oriented strategy). Colonel Ratchford thought that this would be
interesting science. Colonel Hippler said that this was the road to another
public relations catastrophe. Don't emphasize this either. Franklin Roach
preferred to downplay the Wertheimer perceptual concerns and concentrate on
powerful cases (a Hynek-NICAP-type approach). Condon immediately challenged that
as not being able to approach an ETH decision. Jack Evans of the Sacramento Peak
high-altitude observatory suggested looking at cases involving credible
experienced observers, such as pilots (the other half of the Hynek-NICAP
approach). Hippler thought that might be worth doing. Evans also suggested
trying to bypass the observer problem and get real time data using large sensor
grids. Hippler replied that lots of grids already exist. Maybe they'd be useful.
David Saunders stayed silent a long time. He then suggested the
"other" psychological approach: mass data (which de-emphasizes individual
idiosyncrasies) and attempts to find correlations between discrete qualities of
the reports. Low immediately directed this idea at tests of the credibility of
the observations. Saunders said it went way beyond that. Condon changed the
subject to the social problems UFOs were causing the Air Force and the public.
Finally, Colonel Ratchford thought that concentrating on case categories, which
might pay off scientifically in data on ball lightning or other rare
physical and perceptual phenomena would be a good idea. Condon
was still confused about what they were supposed to do and why. He still thought
studying the observers was a good idea. Ratchford and Hippler finally said: all
we're "asking you to do is to take a look at the problem" (U'FO reports, not
observer problems), and make a recommendation about what we (the USAF) should do
about it in the future. You may not solve the problem, but you may be able to
decide whether it's worth going on. Condon ended with: "It is a very puzzling
problem, gentlemen ... We said we would have an answer on this phase of the work
(methodology) ... by the end of January. But it does not appear that we will
make that deadline." On this, they never made any deadline at all.
RANDOM ACTIVITIES
The Project engaged in many activities and this is no time to
attempt to chronicle them. However, a selection might give the reader a useful
picture of what went on. Early in the game, they attempted to go to school from
a variety of experts. All sorts of individuals traipsed through Boulder to give
them advice: McDonald, Menzel, Hynek, Vallee, Keyhoe, Hall, as well as science
and technology types who knew little about UFOS. Some individuals, such as Bob
Wood and James Harder, insisted on audiences whether they were invited or not.
Of these visitations the one everyone was most concerned about involved Keyhoe
and Hall. It seemed to go well to both sides and set up a temporary cooperative
and respectful exchange between the two organizations. Project members
(especially Low) also attempted education by various trips to areas where
experts or other unique information sources resided. One of these trips created
part of the problem that the project suffered internally. This was Low's trip to
Europe. Such a trip was obviously worth making considering the presence overseas
of two UFOlogical giants, Aime Michel and Charles Bowen. Because Low decided to
combine more than one type of business, and some pleasure, he chose a time when
neither expert was available. Some of the project team were outraged by this
strategy coupled with a stay at Loch Ness to compare UFOs with the "monster".
Whatever excuses one might make, there is no escaping that Low blew it on this.
A dedicated research project requires dedicated research trips. If the two main
reasons for going aren't available, you pick another time. Project members
viewed this correctly as a lack of seriousness on Low's part. Some of the other
trips ended up with "purchases" (subcontracts) from high-priced think-tanks of
technical reports which Condon and Low hoped would add (literally) weight to the
final report.
A major activity demanded by Roach and Saunders was the
collection and analysis of significant old reports. Condon fought against this
consistently but the weight of opinion almost everywhere else insisted that
something at least be done. The agreed-upon idea was that project members would
read piles of candidate cases, discuss them, and nominate the most interesting
for an inclusion into a Case Book of powerful reports. This Case Book would turn
out to be a large significant thing with many pages per case. Condon, as an
absentee project head, and Low, wilting under general opinion, could not police
this very well. The procedure was begun but as the project work grew and people
became spread thin, it fell into disuse, which, of course, was fine with Condon.
A few remnants of the idea remain in the archives at the American Philosophical
Library in Philadelphia, and its "ghost" became Chapter 2 of Section IV of the
report. Many excellent early cases were nominated and folders prepared, which
never made it into the "scientific study". The only areas where responsible
coverage of such cases exists
in the report are the chapters dedicated specifically to
photographic evidence (William Hartmann) and radar evidence (Gordon Thayer).
Persons such as Saunders, Levine, Roach, Hynek, McDonald, Keyhoe, and Hall had
legitimate reasons to being displeased with the coverage of important "old"
cases, especially when data was abundantly, easily available (even right in the
office).
Everyone agreed (even Condon) that field studies on new cases
were a good idea despite their problems. So, a procedure was set up with a UFO
hotline with someone available to answer at any time. Mary Lou Armstrong
typically was the first screener, and Saunders or Low would usually rule on
whether it was hot enough to "go". Certain persons volunteered for field
research, and Roy Craig and Jim Wadsworth were the mainstays. It's hard to
decide exactly how to count these field trips, but, roughly, the team went on
about thirty-eight of them between August 1966 and the end of 1967. Most of the
cases were trivial; things none of us would have made much of an effort on
today. Still there were a few so-called (by Low) "super cases" (ex. Michalak;
Schirmer). Later critics objected that the project didn't seem to be getting, or
perhaps selecting, quality cases. At one time even Condon wrote to complain to
the USAF about slow and incomplete reporting from that source. By the end of the
year the Wright Pat project admitted to nineteen unknowns, most of which either
didn't get to Colorado or weren't deemed important enough to research if they
did. And, as a separate issue regarding current field research on an "old" case
John Fuller had paved the way for a Benjamin Simon hypnosis of Betty and Barney
Hill, if Colorado was interested. They weren't.
Meanwhile, David Saunders had become somewhat overloaded pursuing
his own favorite idea - the computer catalog database. Hopes were high that at
least five hundred cases would be entered in time for the project report.
Simultaneously, Saunders became impressed with Aime Michel's concept of
Orthotenic lines, as an indication of intelligent activity in UFO waves. A major
brou-ha-ha ensued over his insistence on the importance of orthoteny, and its
inclusion in the report. Low was, putting it mildly, unconvinced. An outside
statistical expert was brought in to critique the work. Though the exchange
seems to have been civilized, the bad relations were further frayed. When
Saunders (and Levine) were fired, all this cataloguing and statistics collapsed.
At least, much later, this work emerged as the CUFOS UFOCAT project.
'GOOFINESS' PROJECT ACTIVITIES
Our last brevity about project activities will come under the
heading of "goofiness". This was the element in UFOlogy chosen by Edward Condon
as his own interest. To put this decision in the best light, consider Ed Condon
as someone who doesn't want to do this UFO project, is near the end of his
science career and has paid his dues, and might as well have some fun while he's
involved with this chore. There are, of course, worse lights one could shine on
it. Condon considered all this sort of material under the titles of "Magic" or
"Religion, Cults, Psychological". In several places he is obviously having a
grand time trying to track down malefactors like "Mel Noel", or strange stones
like that of the Tulli Papyrus or the Allende nonsense of the Philadelphia
Experiment. He shared his enjoyment of the stones of the congenial lunatic
"Dickson/Dicksun of the second and third universes" with Dr. Urner Liddel, the
old anti-UFO warhorse of the Office of Naval Research. He ordered Jim Wadsworth
to the Bonneville Salt Flats to check out a "psychic prediction", just in case a
UFO really lands. He wrote to
the governor of Utah to see if he would like to attend. He
created a card system for each "cult", whereupon he hoped to list its
membership, publisher, date of origin, "channel", and home planet among other
pertinencies. This piece of science never materialized, and consequently did not
make the final report. His most controversial act was his highly publicized act
of attending the "little boys having fun" Congress of Scientific UFOlogists held
in New York in June of 1967. Despite heavy pleadings and protestations from the
group, he absolutely insisted on watching the fools’ parade. His presence did
much to increase publicity to its damaging (to UFO research) best. And, without
saying anything, it was his clearest statement about what he felt about the
field.
PROJECT RESULTS
The most concrete result was the approximately thousand-page
paperback that most serious UFOlogists have sitting on their shelves (Gillmor,
1969). To those of us who have opened it, it has a peculiar structure, almost
audibly saying, "don't try to read me". Paranoia aside, this probably is not
deliberate. Reading the primary documents of the project indicates very clearly
that the organization's chaos and personnel dislocations that afflicted it made
the creation of a smooth document impossible.
The project deadline ensured that editing and arranging was a
process bordering on the hysterical. When one adds to this a real deliberate
decision to obfuscate the individual cases by not precisely locating them in
time or space (or, of course, witnesses), it's a miracle that one can get
anything out of reading it at all. The late director of Air Force Intelligence,
Charles Cabell, had characterized the Project Grudge report as "the most poorly
written piece of unscientific tripe I've ever read". One wonders what he would
have said about this one?
Of course, in a thousand-page book there are bound to be things
worth reading. The main things focused upon here have been the cases and their
identifiability. Many heroic readers (inc. James McDonald and Peter Sturrock)
noticed that a close look at the report's own results clearly points to an
ongoing mystery in the field, and one with at least the potential for important
discovery (McDonald, 1969; Sturrock, 1974). This has significance mainly because
Dr. Condon said essentially the opposite in his conclusions. This paper being a
historical rather than a data analysis, this incongruency of internal versus
summary conclusions should be explored by the reader in the document or in the
works of Drs. McDonald, Sturrock, et al.
At the larger level of results, the Air Force used Condon's
conclusion, with thanks, to do what they wanted to do: they closed Project
Bluebook permanently.
The conclusion of the report was stated, briefly, as such: there
has been no advance to science through the study of UFOs in the past, and there
likely will be no advance in the future. Consequently, the Air Force should give
up its official project. There are, therefore, three main elements to the
conclusion:
1. There has been no advance.
2. There almost surely never will be.
3. Project Bluebook should close.
Almost everyone would agree to number one. Most, probably, would
agree to number three. The problem was number two. Were UFOs worth studying if
the study was serious and potent? Condon said no. Hynek, McDonald and Keyhoe
said a loud "yes!" What did the Colorado Project, as a whole, say? Here is a
listing of the Project members and their opinion, as can be found in project
records or commentaries shortly after the report materialized.
Edward Condon: no
Robert Low: no
Franklin Roach: yes
David Saunders: yes
Michael Wertheimer: ?, possibly no
Roy Craig: ?, possibly no
Norman Levine: yes
Mary Lou Armstrong: yes
William Hartmann: yes
Frederick Ayer: yes
Dan Culberson: yes
James Wadsworth: yes
Martin Altschuler: ?, possibly no
Gordon Thayer: yes
Gerald Rothberg: yes
Frederick Hooven: yes
My toting up of the "opinion poll" is two "no's", three
undetermineds, and eleven "yes's". Skeptics may say whatever they wish, this
array of opinions from the people within the project form a stark contrast to
the opinion (and it was an opinion) "concluded" by
Condon.
IMPACTS
Opinion or not, the report had strong impacts. The Air Force, as
noticed, closed Bluebook. This had the desired side effect of lessening the
amount of conversation about flying saucers linked to the military.
Science magazine welcomed the report, and the bastion of
hyper-conservative prejudices, Nature, even more so (Boffey, 1969;
Nature, 1969). But the overall result in the scientific community was
surprisingly mixed. The mere existence of a university project had brought
UFOlogy out of the closet, and, for the moment legitimatised it. Many scientists
had written to Condon and the project expressing interest. The report didn't
stop this trend. Condon found himself in a position of trying to talk scientists
out of holding seminars on the subject. The worst came for Condon when the
foursome of Thornton Page, Walter Orr Roberts, Carl Sagan, and Philip Morrison
decided to create an all-day symposium at the American Association for the
Advancement of Science meeting. Reading the manuscript collections on this
battle of power and prejudices (on all sides) is one of the more enlightening
experiences to anyone interested in the non-ideal nature of real scientists. The
AAAS symposium was ultimately held, and was mainly negative in tone, but it did
not put a stop to academic interest either (Page, Sagan, 1972). Rather, the
early to mid-seventies were a boom time for academic involvement, albeit mostly
behind the scenes rather than, as at AAAS, in the spotlight. It was the
main
era of the so-called "invisible college", and featured the work
of Allen Hynek, Peter Sturrock, Frank Salisbury, Leo Sprinkle, and James Harder,
among many others. In the popular eye, however, the period from the end of
Condon to the big wave of 1973 was a fade-out era for UFOS. Whether by cause or
coincidence, NICAP began to fail and APRO had a bit of downturn. On the other
hand, the exact time also saw the rise of another popular power in UFOlogy, the
Mutual UFO Network. The Condon project's immediate effect toward down playing
UFO research, therefore, was restricted to two areas: the contractor got what it
wanted out of the conclusion; and the highest levels of the science
establishment firmed in their stand not to give monetary support to
UFOlogists.
THE ISSUES OF BIAS
The Condon report has been much maligned as a document not
reflecting the views of the project researchers, nor the data contained therein.
Given some reasonable slack for the short time and money available for the work,
this maljudgment is still justified. The question which arose, blaringly in
public, was: was the project prejudiced from the beginning? People have argued,
vociferously, both ways. To this author the answer is completely and
documentably clear.
The question of bias could be approached in several ways: (a) Was
the contractor biased? Was there a certain answer that it wanted, or worse, even
demanded? (b) Was the contractee (lead researcher) biased? (c) Was the project
administrator biased? and (d) What did the people who worked on
the project say?
A. Regarding the contractor (the USAF): I believe that
only the most extreme of position-takers would try to argue that the Air Force
had an open mind about what it wanted to see come out of this grant. The Air
Force wanted to get UFOs out of the Air Force, period. To do this the phenomenon
had to be made to appear trivial, at least in terms of technology and security.
Because the Air Force had the responsibility to ensure safety in the skies, even
as regards long shot possibilities, the phenomenon probably needed to be
trivialized in all respects to rationalize completely dumping it. Fortunately
for the historian, none of this has to be laid at the door of assumption. The
main information-carriers of both elements in the Air Force critical to the
project tell us so in the existent documents. In a belligerent interview with
Foreign Technology Division chief, Colonel Raymond Sleeper, Robert Low and
Bluebook personnel were treated to the following exchange:
Sleeper: "Do you know what benefit the Air Force has derived from
the Bluebook study? ... Zero! UFOs exist because people, faced with an
unstructured existence, find the need to structure it. If you'll just find out
about that, you'll find the key to the UFO problem"
Low: "Why did you give the contract to the University of
Colorado? Do you consider it a waste of money?"
Sleeper: "I do." (Low, 1966)
And, turning to the Pentagon, we have mentioned the briefing to
Ratchford, Hippler et al, earlier. Colonel Hippler was the contact point between
Colorado and the higher-ups. Low had tried to get him to tell them clearly what
the Air Force wanted, during the briefing. Hippler had dodged. We should
remember that this was a contract initiated by the USAF, not Condon and Low.
Condon and Low were doing this in service to the Air Force, not
for themselves. What the contractor wanted was vital to be clear upon. Three
days after the briefing, upon returning to the Pentagon, Hippler wrote Condon
(Hippler, 1967). He opened by saying that this was an informal letter and not to
be taken as official Air Force position. Well, anyone is welcome to buy that,
but one would suggest a few visits to a common sense counselor would be helpful.
Low, who responded for Condon, showed that he was hip to exactly what he was
hearing. Hippler had two things to say. He was unhappy with the Wertheimer
Hypothesis, and felt that Colorado could come to an
anti-extraterrestrial conclusion. Secondly, he emphasized how costly Project
Bluebook had been over the years, and that they'd really like to get rid of it.
If Colorado needed an extension in order to come up with a "proper
recommendation" that would be arranged (recall that this was January 1967 and
the Colorado Project had just started). Low wrote back thanking him, "You have
answered quite directly the question that I asked." The Air Force absolutely
wanted a recommendation ending Project Bluebook, preferably tied to some
trivializing assessment of UFOS. They said so night up front, but only to Condon
and Low.
B. Regarding the contractee (Condon): Some writers might
want to defend Edward Condon as going into the fray with an open mind, but
coming out with a closed one. The "coming out" with closed, and highly
emotional, statements is certainly clear, and all over the documentation.
"Coming in" takes a little more assessment. What we know for sure is that Condon
took the project as a patriotic service, and, therefore, knowing what the Air
Force needed, would function accordingly. This is, of course, prejudice enough,
but what did he personally feel? Condon made several public speaking "boners"
which many take to be spontaneously revelatory of his inner views. Perhaps they
were. Condon was however a witty joker, and these faux pas could have been just
bad judgment. But when all is weighed, I believe that one must admit a strong
negative bias, only held in check by his knowledge that this was a touchy public
relations situation. In April of 1967, still very early in the project, Condon
received a letter objecting that UFOs are a waste of time. Condon wrote the
following (and wisely did not mail it):
"The study of UFO reports is an elusive thing. I'm not sure that
the government ought to be spending any money on it ... I did
not seek it, and it is not fun. It was thrust upon me, and is distracting me
from another job which I would rather do."
He goes on to suggest that the writer send the letter
recommending that the government eliminate spending on "uncatchable, unprovable,
unidentifiable unthings" to Robert McNamara, USAF Secretary Harold Brown, and
members of the House Committee on Armed Services (Condon, 1967). With these
initial attitudes it is no surprise Condon could write a report summary so much
at variance with his staff. One positive nod to the grand old scientist,
however: he knew, despite it all, that something scientifically
interesting might be in here somewhere. And so, he carefully crafted his
language so as to encourage others to look, but not to encourage funding. More
on this in a moment.
C. Regarding the administrator (Low): Robert Low is a more
difficult figure to comprehend. He was not a scientist, despite being around
science all his working life. He was a savvy administrator, who knew what was
important: the contractor, the higher administration, the boss. But he often
also demonstrated a refreshing, almost childlike curiosity about these neat
things he was delving into. I believe that this put Low into an awkward
position: doing a "Condon-imitation" trying to police a project headed toward a
fixed conclusion, while being honestly interested in a lot of it himself. In the
end, of course, the "administrator" and the job won out. In his administrator's
hat Robert Low wrote the infamous "trick" memo of which so much has been written
(Low, 1966A). A great semantic debate has been held over the various ways the
word "trick" can be used, and everyone is correct. The tale is told, however, by
reading the whole memo in the context of the time. The Air Force has just
convinced Condon to try the project. Bob Low has just been briefed himself as to
his and the university's role. The idea has just been floated by the high
administration and all sorts of objections are arising. Low, the effective
administrator- politician, is attempting to cast the potential project in a way
that will mollify the objectors. Whether he believes any of what he himself is
saying or not, he describes the project in ways which emotional, prejudiced
people might tolerate. His use of "trick" and all the surrounding words meant to
cast the project into a "proper light" for these "UFO negative" people.
Of course it ends up sounding prejudicial against UFOs as
serious entities. It has to. That's the audience he's writing
to. The real question is not the Low memo, it's what Low himself believed. That
we may never know. All we can assess is how he acted. In that he was the loyal
right arm of Edward Condon, as was his Job. Many of the project staff were
unhappy with his actions and interferences, the strongest statement of which is
in the resignation letter of Mary Lou Armstrong (Armstrong, 1968).
D. Regarding the views of the project team members: Given
that so many of these people disagreed with Condon's concluding opinions, the
fact that they viewed the project to be biased early on needs little further
documentation. Statements abound in the aforementioned Armstrong letter, the
rebutting Saunders-Harkin book (1968), and letters following the project by
Thayer, Roach, Rothberg, etc, Toting up the score sheet on evidences of bias, we
find strong, usually concretely documented, signs of prejudice in all four
venues. Since 100 percent is pretty good coverage, it seems that the conclusion
that the Colorado Project had strong early UFO-negative biases is a good
assumption.
There is one other element in this to explore, however. The USAF
could have received what they wanted out of the conclusions without there being
such a strong negative on the UFOs as potentially scientifically interesting.
They were obviously of potential scientific interest, as people
kept coming up with all sorts of wild physical and psychological hypotheses to
explain them. Colonel Ratchford mentioned about a half dozen "spinoffs" he
considered intriguing if the project wanted to look into them. But the
recommendation was a much stronger negative in the end. Why?
Edward Condon seemed to be open to the idea of further academic
study of some elements of this subject until about halfway through the project.
Then he changed. What happened? All sorts of scientists began talking about
getting government funding for UFO research: Allen Hynek, of course;
more surprisingly, Frank Drake, William Hartmann, Frederick Ayer;
and most threateningly, James McDonald. A very powerful red flag went up in
Condon's mind. Red ink. Funding deficits for other worthier science. 1967 began
for the sciences what were to be called the "doldrum years" of government (non-)
funding. Cutbacks were severe and everywhere. McDonald, with his characteristic
aggression, talked before Congress of a UFO budget dwarfing that of the space
program. Others had chimed in, usually with a little more restraint, but
everyone was talking serious dollars. Condon knew how many scientists were
interested; some, famous names. He knew that the idea was getting a hearing from
the non-scientist politicians who controlled money. One more flap and this would
become a scientific catastrophe. So Condon did everything he could do. He
pounded the hammer down. UFOs were nonsense. They did not seem to deserve any
research at all. And they certainly did not deserve to be funded.
FINAL REMARKS
The Colorado Project is a very educational research topic. It
begins back with idealistic naivete (by Hynek), and ends with pragmatics,
economics, and social forces. As the currents of personalities and powers
intersected, it became a conclusion waiting for a process to present it. And in
the end, who won? The Air Force won. They finally achieved what they needed for
twenty years: the deconstructing of the public link between themselves and UFOS.
And who lost? The search for the Truth; the ideals of academia and science; and
Jim McDonald, to whose death this might have contributed in
part.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The author wishes to thank the officials and staff of the
American Philosophical Library, the University of Colorado, and the Center for
UFO Studies for access to the relevant materials from those archives.
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